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Abstract 
 
Vallentyne 2010 and Zwolinski 2008 are internet encyclopaedia articles on “libertarianism” 
which include various serious faults. Vallentyne 2010 has the following ones. It does not 
properly explain mainstream libertarianism or consider criticisms of it. Instead, it mainly 
discusses self-ownership and natural-resource egalitarianism. Every aspect of the alleged 
“strict sense” of “libertarianism” is dubious, at best. So-called “left-libertarianism” is not 
made sense of as any kind of liberty-based libertarianism. Problems arise because self-
ownership is assumed to be libertarian without an explicit theory of libertarian liberty. The 
replies to “five important objections to full self-ownership” are confused and mistaken; both 
as regards philosophical analysis and as regards empirical assumptions. The long discussion 
about various ways to “Appropriate Natural Resources” is rendered muddled and barren by 
the lack of a clear libertarian theory of liberty, the mere presumption of some form of 
egalitarianism, and the inclusion of various non-libertarian criteria. The remaining sections 
are largely uninformed by any relevant libertarian literature. It reaches a justificationist 
conclusion that cites mistaken welfare concerns and ignores the productivity of free markets. 
Zwolinski 2008 shares some errors with Vallentyne 2010, but also includes the following ones. 
It is even less clear about what libertarian liberty is. It fails to understand that libertarianism 
(private-property anarchy and, possibly, minarchy) is a subset of classical liberalism. It 
asserts that libertarianism is about “the proper role of government.” It assumes (illogical) 
justificationist/foundationalist epistemology and does not mention critical-rationalist 
libertarianism. It eventually faults justificationism and unwittingly assumes something 
approaching critical rationalism. Finally, it embraces John Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” 
as a “justification” (i.e., defence) of libertarianism in ignorance of the similar position in 
Lester 1996 and 2000. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There are two internet philosophy encyclopaedia entries on libertarianism that include various serious 
faults: Vallentyne 2010 and Zwolinski 2008. As innocent members of the public are at risk of reading 
these accounts of libertarianism, some critical responses seem appropriate. This essay begins with 
Vallentyne 2010 as the one on which there is by far the most to say. 
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Vallentyne 2010’s “Libertarianism” 
 
This is a criticism of Vallentyne 2010: the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on 
―libertarianism‖. This is an entry that might be expected to use philosophy to explain libertarianism 
generally and evaluate major criticisms of it. Instead, it devotes much space to discussing only self-
ownership and natural-resource egalitarianism. This essay will not comment on those parts of the 
entry that appear correct, or at least not significantly incorrect. It will comment on most of it. 
Before beginning specific responses, it might help to clarify the arguments to note two matters. 
First, what is here assumed as the theory of ‗interpersonal liberty‘ (as opposed to other senses of 
‗liberty‘, whether ideological or not). This is that liberty is ―the absence of interpersonal proactively 
imposed costs‖ or, for brevity, ―the absence of proactive impositions.‖ And thus libertarianism is the 
ideology of the minimization and rectification of any such proactive impositions. There will be no 
immediate attempt further to explain and unpack these theories of liberty and libertarianism.
2
 Second, 
what follows might appear pedantic in places. However, in the world of scholarship, ―pedantic‖ ought 
to be a term of praise, more or less. Moreover, one general theory about philosophy itself is that it just 
is being pedantic about presuppositions. 
The Vallentyne 2010 encyclopaedia entry begins thus: ―Libertarianism, in the strict sense, is the 
moral view that agents initially fully own themselves and have certain moral powers to acquire 
property rights in external things.‖ It will be convenient to break this first sentence into parts. 
 
Libertarianism, in the strict sense, … 
 
There is no one ―strict sense‖ of libertarianism. There is a cluster of competing theories that agree at 
most, and sometimes implicitly at best, only on the abstract principle of advocating interpersonal 
liberty. Some of these theories will have more precision and some less. The majority view might 
approximate to Vallentyne 2010‘s suggested view. But it is not strict and it is not correct. 
 
… is the moral view…. 
 
Libertarianism is certainly normally held as a moral view. However, it is conceivable for someone to 
advocate libertarianism as, for instance, 1) objective economic advice on how to promote prosperity, 
or 2) for purely self-interested reasons (it is better for the advocate than any other ideology), or 3) 
even for misanthropic reasons (if he believes this would be a human disaster and wishes that to 
occur). It is conceivable to have an entire world in which people hold one or more of such, or similar, 
views and no moral views. But, surely, they would still be referring to libertarianism. Thus 
libertarianism is not inherently (―in the strict sense‖) a ―moral view‖. Or, if we are to dismiss such 
logical possibilities as irrelevant to the collective sociological fact of libertarianism as a moral view, 
then we should at least concede that it has an objective content that is entirely separable from the 
moral advocacy of that content. 
This is mentioned partly because it is sometimes helpful, even crucial, in an argument about 
libertarianism, and other ideologies, to distinguish factual points from moral points. And if we allow 
the view that libertarianism is ―in the strict sense‖, or a priori, or necessarily, or analytically, or 
conceptually, or inherently, or whatever, a moral view, then this conflation often makes the process of 
some philosophical argument concerning a factual or a moral aspect difficult or impossible. Both 
criticisms of libertarianism and libertarian advocacy often use moral arguments where they are not 
germane to the issue in question and thereby muddy the philosophical waters. 
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… that agents initially fully own themselves… 
 
Neither is it necessary that libertarianism requires that ―agents initially fully own themselves.‖ If we 
start with a pre-propertarian theory of interpersonal liberty, then, ―in the strict sense‖, agents ipso 
facto do not initially fully own themselves: because no one yet owns anything. And it is a contingent 
matter whether observing such liberty will result in self-ownership. We can imagine someone being 
born in a position whereby his very existence will begin as an enormous threat to others. For instance, 
someone born as a hyper-infectious, fatal-disease carrier who is bound to kill others unless he is 
himself first killed. As that would make him an intolerable proactive imposition upon others, he 
cannot own himself in the sense of having a libertarian property claim to preserve his own body. For 
other people have a stronger libertarian claim to destroy him in their self-defence.
3
 All examples are 
likely to be somewhat far-fetched, perhaps. But the fact that they are possible in principle shows that a 
libertarian theory of liberty need not presuppose the inherent legitimacy of private property rights 
even initially in one‘s own body. And thus we can show the errors of such related criticisms of 
libertarianism as that it presupposes that private property is necessary, it is defined in terms of private 
property, and it presupposes that private property is moral. 
 
… and have certain moral powers to acquire property rights in external things. 
 
It follows from an objective libertarian theory that ownership of external things is also possible. But 
we need a theory and circumstances to show how and what objective property follows. Then, whether 
such ownership is – never, sometimes, or always – moral is an entirely separate matter. 
At the end of its brief introduction, Vallentyne 2010 distinguishes what it calls ―left-‖ and ―right-
libertarianism‖: 
 
Both endorse full self-ownership, but they differ with respect to ... unowned natural resources 
.... Right-libertarianism holds that typically such resources may be appropriated by the first 
person who discovers them, mixes her labor with them, or merely claims them.... Left-
libertarianism, by contrast, holds that unappropriated natural resources belong to everyone in 
some egalitarian manner. 
 
It is clear that so-called ―right-libertarianism‖ is a kind of libertarianism as the term is normally used. 
It is not clear that so-called ―left-libertarianism‖ is a kind of libertarianism. It would seem just as 
confusing to call it ‗right-egalitarianism.‘ It is clearly a combination of self-ownership (an idea not 
unique to libertarianism, in any case) and some version of ‗natural-resource egalitarianism.‘ If there 
were at least some theory that purported to explain that liberty entails natural-resource equality, 
despite how ‗libertarianism‘ is normally used, then things might be different. But that is not what is 
argued at any point in Vallentyne 2010. That said, it is theoretically possible to use natural resources 
in a way that flouts liberty. But there does not thereby appear to be any connection with 
egalitarianism, except in the vacuous sense that everyone is equally entitled to liberty. More on this 
later. 
Section 1 on self-ownership states that: 
 
Full-self [sic] ownership is sometimes thought to guarantee that the agent has a certain basic 
liberty of action, but this is not so. For if the rest of the world (natural resources and artifacts) 
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is fully (―maximally‖) owned by others, one is not permitted to do anything without their 
consent – since that would involve the use of their property. 
 
However, this paradox (in the loose, non-contradictory, sense) can be avoided with a pre-propertarian 
theory of libertarian liberty. For by such a pre-propertarian theory, it would proactively impose on 
others to own all of the natural resources in such a way that this occurs.
4
 If Vallentyne 2010 included 
a theory of liberty it might also imply this. As things stand, it cannot even explain what, if anything, 
self-ownership has to do with liberty.
5
 It is taken as an axiom that self-ownership is identical with 
liberty, when there ought to be philosophical analysis. Admittedly, Vallentyne 2010 has a lot of 
company among other texts on libertarian theory in this matter. 
Vallentyne 2010 continues, ―Let us now consider five important objections to full self-
ownership.‖ And in each case this essay will give immediate responses to these posed objections. It is 
necessary to take Vallentyne 2010‘s words at face value where there is no other clear sense of what is 
written, despite the fact that it sometimes seems to strain after a distinction or theory beyond the plain 
meanings of the actual words it uses. 
And so we are then told that, ―One objection to full (interpersonal) self-ownership is that it denies 
that individuals have an obligation to help others in need, except through voluntary agreement or prior 
wrongdoing.‖ But people can have a moral obligation without having an enforceable obligation. This 
is probably just what most libertarians do believe: that there is sometimes some moral obligation to 
help some others in dire need, but it is usually up to the individual to follow his conscience as to how 
far. 
It continues, ―Those who advocate libertarianism as a theory of the duties owed to others typically 
endorse full (interpersonal) self-ownership and are subject to this objection.‖ Unless we are dealing 
with mere logical possibilities, the implication here is that in a libertarian society some people will 
often need urgent help and not receive it. That is certainly the situation in the non-libertarian world 
today. State taxes, regulations, and restrictions on trade and migration are a large part of the problem. 
It is hard to see how vast numbers of people would be in systematic dire need in a libertarian society 
in such a way that charity was completely insufficient and forced transfers would do more good than 
harm. But suppose that is wrong? If libertarianism were perceived as a welfare disaster for human 
beings, then why would libertarians advocate it? There is simply no reason to suppose that libertarians 
would, or are theoretically obliged to, insist on liberty though the heavens fall. Nor is it necessary, or 
possible, that they should start making theoretical qualifications or contingency plans for all the 
infinite logically possible disasters. An additional reason here, is that this might mislead people into 
thinking that they are more than logical possibilities and, consequently, they might become self-
fulfilling fears if state mechanisms were set up to avert them and then proceeded as state failure 
normally does. We are also told that such libertarians ―reject any such obligation on the ground that it 
induces a form of partial slavery.‖ But taxation, or even occasionally coerced assistance, is not 
―partial slavery.‖ It is hyperbole to call it such. 
It is then stated that ―Those who advocate libertarianism as theory of enforceable duties, however, 
need not be subject to this objection.‖ It is not clear what Vallentyne has in mind here, despite his 
following explanation: 
 
They can endorse full political self-ownership, without endorsing full (interpersonal) self-
ownership. The two are the same except the former is silent about what duties one may owe to 
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others and asserts instead that one has no enforceable duties to aid others, except those that 
arise from voluntary agreement and prior wrongdoing. 
 
What is ―political self-ownership‖? What is ―political‖ about it? It is not intelligible why possible 
non-enforceable duties are ―political‖ or why they are not compatible with ―full (interpersonal) self-
ownership.‖ 
The entry continues, ―Of course, many would still insist that we have non-voluntary enforceable 
duties to aid those in extreme need when we can do so at little cost to ourselves or others.‖ Why leap 
to the use of aggressive coercion as the first remedy (especially when this is not likely to be a major 
problem in any society)? A variety of fully libertarian contractual arrangements would be possible 
here – such as guarantees of such assistance among all who opt in; or the rules of a private area: ―on 
pain of penalty X, patrons of this private beach must alert the lifeguard and throw the provided 
lifebelts to any people apparently in distress in the water.‖ And we could also have a variety of fully 
libertarian ―punishments‖ (publicly naming, boycotting, etc.) available for those who do not abide by 
minimally decent behaviour (such as not phoning for an obviously needed emergency service) even if 
they have not contracted into any system of it. Having to think about and compete in practices to 
discover the best ways to promote minimally decent behaviour is more likely to result in the 
promotion of that behaviour. The lazy and authoritarian resort to aggressive coercion is, as ever, both 
illiberal and inefficient. 
We now come to, 
 
A second objection ... the question is whether others may use the agent's person without her 
consent to aid those in need. For example, is it permissible to gently push an innocent agent to 
the ground in order to save ten innocent lives? Full self-ownership (of both sorts) asserts that 
it is not. 
 
In addition to the previous reply, libertarianism need not be interpreted as absolutely proscriptive of 
all possible liberty violations (or proactive impositions). One might even say that, in a sense, liberty 
violations are allowed provided that full restitution is made. If the person in the example above 
receives full restitution, then who is left to complain that this is not, in the end or overall, libertarian? 
Perhaps it was temporarily unlibertarian but the situation was then rectified along libertarian lines. A 
critic might insist that libertarianism has been abandoned here, because it is clear that a violation has 
taken place. However, that seems analogous to someone saying that a football (or soccer) match was 
invalid because a foul had taken place, even though the foul was penalized. Both libertarianism and 
football simply include rules for what to do about, in practice inevitable, violations of various sorts. 
Libertarianism and football are not undermined but reinforced by such responses. However, the critic 
might go on to suggest that the analogy is the wrong one, and a better analogy would be chess: for 
there to break the rules is to invalidate the game; you are simply not playing chess if you make an 
illegal move. But that cannot be right either. For the rules of chess also simply specify the relevant 
penalties for illegal moves or activities. In one sense, libertarianism, football, and chess can be seen as 
including certain ‗absolute‘ proscriptions and prescriptions. And yet, as they all include rules about 
how to deal with violations of the proscriptions and prescriptions, it is clear that violations do not 
mean that we have thereby abandoned the ‗game.‘ However, even if this analysis is theoretically 
flawed in some way, it still seems to remain a completely practical solution to the problem posed. 
Next, a ―third objection to full self-ownership is that it includes a right to make gifts of one's 
services, and that such gifts ... can significantly disrupt the conditions of equality of opportunity.‖ 
Equality, in its various ideological forms, is usually regarded as dystopian by libertarians. Equality of 
opportunity is not even possible. And coercive attempts to move towards it destroy liberty and 
welfare. Such replies are not even mentioned in Vallentyne 2010.
6
 
And then a ―fourth objection to full self-ownership is that it permits voluntary enslavement.‖ But 
this logical possibility is hardly realistic as a serious problem. In any case, self-ownership permits 
suicide too – and that is far more drastic. Those who use proactive coercion to prevent voluntary 
enslavement or suicide are thereby stealing those choices from other people: choices that, ex ante (and 
there is no conscious ex post with suicide), are preferred by those individuals to the alternatives. 
Vallentyne 2010 continues, ―One might, however, reply that the right to exercise one's autonomy is 
more fundamental than the protection or promotion of one's autonomy.‖ Yes, one might. But then it 
looks as though one would be arguing about some sense of autonomy instead, which is usually 
distinguishable from liberty. It is part of liberty to reject autonomy and be heteronymous if one 
wishes. 
Finally, 
 
A fifth objection to full self-ownership is that it (like rights in general) can lead to inefficient 
outcomes. Where there are externalities or public goods (such as police protection), each 
person may be better off if some of each person's rights are infringed (e.g., if each person is 
required to provide service each week on a police patrol). Given the problems generated by 
prisoners‘ dilemmas and other kinds of market failure, in large societies it will typically be 
impossible to obtain everyone's consent to perform such services. Given the importance of 
such services, it is arguably permissible to force individuals to provide certain services (in 
violation of full self-ownership) as long as everyone benefits appropriately. 
 
All this is mere logical possibility presented as the way things really are. It would be irrelevant to 
rehearse all the arguments and evidence here, but it was coming to see that the state is the problem 
rather than the solution that is usually what converted statists to libertarianism. So it is either ignorant 
or disingenuous to suppose that libertarians cannot see, or do not care about, the alleged inefficiencies 
of interpersonal liberty. As we shall see later, Vallentyne 2010 appears to perceive genuine force in 
this sort of criticism. Therefore, it does not appear to be disingenuous. 
We then go on to, ―2. The Power to Appropriate Natural Resources: Libertarianism, Left and 
Right.‖ It begins, ―One possible view holds that initially no one has any liberty right to use, or any 
moral power to appropriate, natural resources.‖ In what way is this absence of a ―liberty right‖ a 
libertarian ―possible view‖? How does this relate to liberty? More precisely, where is the theory of 
liberty from which this result is derivable, and where is the derivation? 
It continues: 
 
A radical version of joint-ownership left-libertarianism, for example, holds that individuals 
may use natural resources only with the collective consent .... Given that all action requires the 
use of some natural resources (land, air, etc.), this leaves agents no freedom of action (except 
with the permission of others), and this is clearly implausible. 
 
It seems plausible in the sense that the majority, at least, would surely consent to a rule that allowed 
everyone minimal action, at least. But what does that joint ownership have to do with liberty? Instead, 
Vallentyne 2010 suggests a ―less radical version of joint-ownership left-libertarianism allows that 
agents may use natural resources, but holds that they have no moral power to appropriate natural 
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resources without the collective consent of the members of society....‖ ―Libertarianism‖? No. It is still 
a version of communism. 
Vallentyne 2010‘s criticism is that, ―Although this leaves agents a significant range of freedom of 
action, it leaves them little security in their plans of action.‖ Suddenly ―security‖ is introduced. What 
has security to do with liberty? Admittedly, the theory is not practical. But it is not impracticality that 
shows it not to be libertarian. It continues, ―Given the central importance of security of some external 
resources, it is implausible that agents have no power to appropriate without the consent of others.‖ 
What does ―implausible‖ refer to? Implausible as being practical? Certainly. Implausible as relating to 
a theory of ―left libertarianism‖? How can we tell without an explicit version of that implicit theory? 
Maybe it is ―implausible‖ because ―left libertarianism‖ is itself ―implausible.‖ It concludes, ―A 
plausible account of liberty rights and powers of appropriation over natural resources must, I claim, be 
unilateralist ....‖ And this sounds, prima facie, plausible as regards a practical theory of interpersonal 
liberty. But it does not relate to ―left libertarianism‖ in any way that is theoretically explained. 
It is then suggested that ―additional conditions may include ... some kind of ‗fair share‘ 
constraint.‖ So now we are introduced to the notion of a ―fair share constraint.‖ It is necessary to ask 
again, what does this have to do with liberty? As Bishop Butler famously observed, ―Every thing is 
what it is, and not another thing.‖7 And as Isaiah Berlin rightly pointed out, ―The notion of the perfect 
whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist, seems to me not merely unattainable – 
that is a truism – but conceptually incoherent.‖8 Is it not possible that liberty is sometimes unfair? And 
even – ―Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon.‖9 – that ―left libertarianism‖ is 
sometimes unfair? As usual, we are not so much denying what has been asserted as asking for a 
philosophical argument that connects apparently distinct things – and ultimately to liberty. 
Vallentyne 2010 goes on accurately to summarize some libertarian‘s views: ―Radical right 
libertarianism ... holds that that there are no fair share constraints on use or appropriation ....‖ And he 
points out an apparent problem with these views: 
 
... no human agent created natural resources, and there is no reason that the lucky person who 
first claims rights over a natural resource should reap all the benefit that the resource provides. 
Nor is there any reason to think the individuals are morally permitted to ruin or monopolize 
natural resources as they please. 
 
This sees things as about what is ―morally permitted‖ rather than what is ‗libertarianly permitted.‘ 
Hence it concludes, categorically, that, ―Some sort of fair share condition restricts use and 
appropriation.‖ However, instead, it should conclude, tentatively, that ―Some sort of libertarian share 
condition possibly restricts use and appropriation.‖ Vallentyne 2010‘s theory of liberty is not only 
tacit but conflated with morality. It does not see that two separate questions must be possible here: 
What does liberty allow? Is liberty morally desirable? 
It then considers ―Lockean libertarianism‖, whereby – thanks to the ―Lockean proviso that 
‗enough and as good‘ be left for others‖ – ―Those who use natural resources, or claim rights over 
them, owe compensation to others for any wrongful costs imposed.‖ And, again, ―wrongful‖ ought to 
be first examined for being ‗illiberal‘ or ‗unlibertarian‘, especially in an article on libertarianism.  
Vallentyne 2010 compares this with ―Nozickean right-libertarianism‖ which ―interprets the 
Lockean proviso as requiring that no individual be made worse off by the use or appropriation of a 
natural resource compared with non-use or non-appropriation.‖ And Nozick does make some sort of, 
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unfortunately also tacit, libertarian sense. Liberty as such is about the absence of constraints. 
Interpersonal liberty, in its libertarian sense, is about the absence of proactive constraints on people by 
other people (or some equivalent form of words). And other people are not proactively constraining us 
if they are not making us worse off (at least, prima facie and ceteris paribus
10
). But the given criticism 
of Nozick here is that 
 
One might object that this sets the compensation payment too low. ... There is little reason, 
one might argue, to hold that those who first use or claim rights over a natural resource should 
reap all the excess benefits that those resources provide. 
 
One might also object that this entertained criticism has no apparent connection with liberty. There is, 
however, an implicit assumption that equality is desirable and that others owe us things we have in no 
way produced, as they have done, simply in virtue of our existence. 
Next we are offered, ―Sufficientarian (centrist) libertarianism‖ which ―interprets the Lockean 
proviso as requiring that others be left an adequate share of natural resources (on some conception of 
adequacy).‖ Yet again, what does all this – a ―sufficient‖ or ―adequate‖ share of natural resources – 
have to do with liberty? Answer came there none. It continues, ―some libertarians, left-libertarians, 
argue that it nevertheless fails to recognize the extent to which natural resources belong to all of us in 
some egalitarian manner.‖ But if it is in an ―egalitarian manner‖ then how is it libertarian or even 
compatible with liberty? Answer came there none. 
We are then asked to consider ―Equal share left-libertarianism‖ which ―interprets the Lockean 
proviso as requiring that one leave an equally valuable share of natural resources for others ... [or] 
compensation….‖ But if people are made no worse off by the propertising of natural resources (or, 
more realistically still, made significantly better off) then how have they been relevantly constrained? 
On the contrary, insisting on an ―equal share‖ or ―compensation‖ would interfere with liberty and 
reduce welfare. This is because it is, for the most part (we can imagine extreme cases), a mere logical 
possibility posing as a real problem that the propertising, as such, of natural resources will interfere 
with interpersonal liberty or human welfare (though non-libertarian propertising can and does do 
that). 
Vallentyne 2010 presses on: 
 
Even equal share libertarianism ... does nothing to offset disadvantages in unchosen internal 
endowments (e.g., the effects of genes or childhood environment). Equal share libertarianism 
is thus compatible with radically unequal life prospects. 
 
Why is the inequality, as such, a problem? Why is any human suffering or deprivation not the real 
problem? And why is some combination of free markets (primarily), family ties, and charity not a 
suitable response to the extent that a response is desirable? In any case, how could such inequalities 
be lessened by the aggressive coercion of politics without both lessening the liberty of some people 
and setting up a moral hazard that promotes the very thing objected to? We need to have many kinds 
of inequality if we are to enjoy prosperity and liberty. Vallentyne offers only argument by egalitarian 
bias. And what is that doing in an encyclopaedia entry purporting to be about libertarianism? 
We are told to ―Consider, then, equal opportunity left-libertarianism .... It interprets the Lockean 
proviso as requiring that one leave enough for others to have an opportunity for well-being that is at 
least as good as the opportunity for well-being that one obtained in using or appropriating natural 
resources ....‖ But, we are reassured, ―Individuals are not morally required to provide personal 
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services or body parts merely because they have more valuable personal endowments.‖ Why not? 
Why stop there? If egalitarianism is desirable, then why should self-ownership limit it? Answer came 
there none. 
Why is any variety of egalitarianism of natural resources a kind of libertarianism? It isn‘t. This is 
a mixture of ideologies. Maybe libertarianism is mistaken. And it is always relevant to criticise it in 
any case. And maybe a mixture of ideologies is the right solution, or at least a better solution. But it 
seems perverse to say that one still has a theory of libertarianism, especially when one has omitted to 
produce any theory of liberty and spent most time discussing different kinds of equality. 
We then proceed to a very short section on ―Enforcement Rights: Prior Restraint and 
Rectification‖. And what follows is a muddle that it will not pay to analyse because it is trying to 
work things out in terms of mere ―self-ownership‖ when it ought to be using a theory of liberty. It 
might help if Vallentyne 2010 were informed here by some of the relevant literature.
11
 
The fourth section is on ―Anarchism and the Minimal State.‖ This outlines the general libertarian 
view and then goes on to argue that 
 
Left-libertarians ... can endorse certain ‗state-like‘ activities .... form organizations that, under 
certain conditions, could force individuals to give them the payment they owe for their rights 
over natural resources, and ... also provide various public goods such as basic police services, 
national defense, roads, parks, and so on. 
 
As already discussed, funding by so-called ―left-libertarian‖ methods is an egalitarian presumption 
unrelated to liberty. Moreover, setting aside national defence for a moment, ―police services, ... roads, 
parks, and so on‖, are simply and clearly not ‗public goods‘ as economics uses the expression. They 
are rivalrous in consumption and providers can exclude non-payers. So why should the market not 
provide them? Nor are there, anarcho-libertarians would argue, any significant public goods. In 
theory, a case for national defence being a public good can be made. But in practice the state versions 
of it generate more war-mongering problems than they offer any real defensive solutions. And even if 
there were significant public goods, there are various ways that they might be dealt with in a 
libertarian manner without leaping to taxation (by another name) and ―‗state like‘ activities.‖ All this 
is discussed in the libertarian literature. 
Section five is listed as ―Some Ancillary Issues‖. There are, in fact, only two issues. The first 
being ―What is the status of non-autonomous beings – such as children and many animals – that have 
moral standing (e.g., because sentient)?‖ Vallentyne 2010 suggests that ―One possible reply is to deny 
that there are any non-autonomous beings with moral standing‖ and ―Another possibility is to hold 
that non-autonomous sentient beings are also full self-owners‖ (this being Vallentyne 2010‘s own 
preference, apparently, but relating to interests and not choices). Again, there is much confusion here 
caused by trying to do everything in terms of self-ownership instead of liberty. But there seems no 
serious philosophical problem. Full liberty is primarily for full adult persons (in the intellectual sense 
of ‗persons‘). Paternalism applies to children to varying degrees, fading away in proportion as they 
approach adulthood. With animals, by contrast, there is a duty of common decency not to inflict 
gratuitous suffering. But this is completely unrelated to libertarianism – let alone self-ownership. 
Libertarianism, or classical liberalism, is for people, not jellyfish, or aardvarks, or even bonobo 
chimpanzees.
12
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 Such as, Lester 2012, Chapter 3, 3.5, b and Lester 2011, Chapter 27. 
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 All that said, the theoretical details of libertarianism with respect to personhood, children, and animals are 
discussed in various entries in the A Libertarian Dictionary: Explaining a Libertarian Theory (Forthcoming). 
The second issue is listed as, ―Historical Principles and the Real World.‖ In particular, ―... we 
have little knowledge of the specific rights violations that took place in the past .... Thus, we have 
little knowledge of what justice today requires.‖ And yet Vallentyne 2010 admits that ―we should 
simply make our best judgments about what is just based on what we know.‖ So that hardly seems a 
problem peculiar to libertarianism. It also notes that ―After the passage of enough time ... the right of 
rectification for a specific past rights-violation may cease to be valid.‖ But it adds that, ―It's not clear, 
however, that there is a plausible principled libertarian justification ... for such a statute of 
limitations.‖ A mere time limit would be arbitrary. But there are clear libertarian reasons for limiting 
claims, if only one has a theory of liberty. As time passes, or, more precisely, as relevant information 
is lost, we eventually cannot have any plausible case for calculating what amount of libertarian 
restitution might be owed by whom to whom. And the disruption that would be caused by enforcing 
restitution based on unfalsifiable speculations and generalisations would itself proactively impose on 
the living far more than it rectifies any previous imposition in the past. Of course, each case needs to 
be examined on its own merits, and there may well be some clear cases (especially as regards the 
inheritance of specific objects) that are traceable and rectifiable after very many generations. 
In section six, we reach the ―conclusion‖ that, 
 
Libertarianism is attractive because (1) it provides significant moral liberty of action, (2) it 
provides significant moral protection against interference from others, and (3) it is sensitive to 
what the past was like (e.g., what agreements were made and what rights violations took 
place). 
 
If you are a justificationist rather than a critical rationalist (more on this later), then you are thereby 
bound to look for reasons to support your theories, including such things as this three-point list. But if 
you are a mainstream libertarian, then how could you possibly overlook the bounty that flows from 
free markets? However, this is, in any case, an irrelevant list of desirable things that could in principle 
be extended indefinitely or simply reduced to ‗because it maximizes liberty.‘ It is much more 
pertinent to write critically that libertarianism 
 
faces, however, the serious objection that it gives too much protection from interference and 
not enough attention to making the future better (e.g., by meeting people's basic needs, 
making people's lives go better, or promoting equality). 
 
More pertinent, but more ignorant. We have been given no sound example to show that libertarianism 
―gives too much protection from interference.‖ Nor has it been shown that it does not better meet 
―people‘s basic needs‖, or make ―people‘s lives go better‖. And only a non-libertarian misanthrope 
could think there is virtue in ―promoting equality‖ as such: to do this there is no need to help the 
worse-off, just destroy more than proportionate wealth of the better-off and you are ―promoting 
equality.‖ 
The entry finishes with what might appear to be an undogmatic and uncontroversial assertion, that 
―the overall assessment of libertarianism is a matter of on-going debate.‖ But this is more like 
dogmatic agnosticism that appeals to the democratic theory of truth (or at least ―assessment‖). The 
factual theses of libertarianism are either true or false. And the moral theses are either right or wrong. 
Vallentyne 2010 has produced no sound criticism of the conjecture that anarcho-libertarianism is true 
and right. Nor has it shown that libertarianism entails or requires any kind of egalitarianism. 
 
 
 
Zwolinski 2008’s “Libertarianism” 
 
Finally, and briefly, we come to Zwolinski 2008: the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on 
―libertarianism.‖ We will ignore any pro-statist errors and criticisms already dealt with in the reply to 
Vallentyne 2010. 
The entry begins, 
 
What it means to be a ‗libertarian‘ in a political sense is a contentious issue, especially among 
libertarians themselves. There is no single theory that can be safely identified as the libertarian 
theory, and probably no single principle or set of principles on which all libertarians can 
agree. 
 
Thus Zwolinski 2008 appears to err in the opposite direction to Vallentyne 2010‘s ―strict sense‖ of 
libertarianism. Is ―What it means to be a ‗libertarian‘‖ really so ―contentious‖? What about liberty 
itself? Is it not true that ―all libertarians can agree,‖ at least at an abstract level, that the ―single 
theory‖ has ultimately to be about interpersonal liberty in some non-interference sense that 
libertarians would recognize? And, therefore, is not liberty the ―single principle‖ on which all 
libertarians ought to agree, at least in principle, or how are they libertarians? Zwolinski 2008 does 
mention ―liberty, understood as non-interference‖ but merely bundles it in with ―a rough agreement 
on a cluster of normative principles, empirical generalizations, and policy recommendations.‖ The 
point is that interpersonal liberty itself must be primary, and any theory that cannot be understood in 
terms of interpersonal liberty is not properly a libertarian theory at all but something else. For 
instance, something that makes self-ownership primary might be better known as ‗self-ownershipism,‘ 
unless it is somehow possible to show that self-ownership is completely identical with, or equivalent 
to, liberty. 
Zwolinski 2008 then writes of ―so-called anarcho-capitalists.‖ There is indeed a problem with this 
name, but it is not spelt out. As capitalist institutions are not compulsory or universal with 
libertarianism, it might be more accurate to call them ‗private-property anarchists.‘ On the basis of 
private-property anarchism, charity is an option and so is communism, at least in families and small 
communities (larger communities cannot make economic calculations without money as a common 
denominator, to signal relative scarcity, and a market in higher-order goods). We are then told, ―On 
the other hand are those who generally identify themselves as classical liberals.‖ And these people 
―are more willing to allow greater room for coercive activity on the part of the state so as to allow, 
say, state provision of public goods or even limited tax-funded welfare transfers.‖ However, there 
were some early classical liberals who were anarchists and minarchists. So there does not appear to be 
a coherent and consistent theoretical full distinction to be made here. Rather, ‗libertarianism‘ is a 
modern word for the anarchist and minarchist subset of ‗classical liberalism‘ (or simply ‗liberalism‘ 
as it was originally called). 
We then start section ―1. The Diversity of Libertarian Theories.‖ And we are told that 
―libertarianism is a theory about the proper role of government.‖ On the contrary, it is primarily a 
social theory about the desirability of interpersonal liberty. Naturally, this has consequences for 
politics, but ―the proper role of government‖ is not the focus. Interpersonal liberty is the focus. The 
clue is in the word ‗libertarianism.‘ Only people who want governments think it is really about 
governments. 
Apparently, libertarianism ―can be, and has been, supported on a number of different 
metaphysical, epistemological, and moral grounds.‖ The critical-rationalist epistemology and the 
possibility of critical-rationalist libertarianism thereby appear to have been entirely overlooked. For 
by critical rationalism – which is not mentioned anywhere in almost 14,000 words – theories are not 
―supported‖ on any ―grounds.‖ Not even on critical-rationalist ―grounds.‖ So an entire 
epistemological approach is completely omitted from this encyclopaedia entry on libertarianism. Even 
if it did not happen to be the correct epistemological approach, this is a significant oversight. We go 
on to be given a list of various justificationist approaches. This is not, by any means, a waste of time. 
For many so-called justifications are better viewed, and completely valid as, different kinds of 
explanations of aspects of how things are (if factual) or ought to be (if moral). An explanation is 
another kind of unjustifiable, but possibly correct, theory. If correct, they are not merely valid but 
sound explanations. However, they remain conjectures. 
We are told that the entry ―will focus almost exclusively on libertarian arguments regarding just 
two philosophical subjects: distributive justice and political authority.‖ However, this is stated to be in 
accord with ―the philosophic literature on libertarianism‖ and this entry is ―a summary of that 
literature.‖ After discussing the various main attempts to find a ―justification‖ (or ―foundations‖) for 
libertarianism, we finally come to the ―Conclusion: Libertarianism as an Overlapping Consensus‖. 
And here Zwolinski 2008 criticizes the whole foundationalist approach because, ―anyone who 
disagrees with one‘s philosophic foundations will not be much persuaded by one‘s conclusions drawn 
from them.‖ And it goes on to observe that, ―As a result, much of the most interesting work in 
contemporary libertarian theory skips systematic theory-building altogether, and heads straight to the 
analysis of concrete problems.‖ This is to stumble into something approximating to critical-rationalist 
libertarianism without even realizing that this is what has happened. 
It continues, 
 
Often this analysis proceeds by accepting some set of values as given – often the values 
embraced by those who are not sympathetic to libertarianism as a political theory – and 
showing that libertarian political institutions will better realize those values than competing 
institutional frameworks. 
 
It cites Daniel Shapiro ―arguing that contemporary welfare states are unjustifiable from a variety of 
popular theoretical approaches,‖ Loren Lomasky ―arguing that Rawls‘s foundational principles are 
better suited to defending Nozickian libertarianism than even Nozick‘s foundational principles are,‖ 
and David Schmidtz arguing that ―market institutions are supported on grounds of individual 
responsibility that any moral framework ought to take seriously.‖ With justificationist language and 
errors expunged, all of these arguments have counterparts in Lester 2012. There is, however, a crucial 
mistake in Zwolinski 2008 assuming that this approach cannot be applied equally to all political 
philosophical theory. For political philosophy does not need to aim for ―theoretical completeness‖ or 
―complete agreement on comprehensive moral theories,‖ as it supposes. It is enough for political 
philosophy to conjecture a theory and then reply to specific criticisms and criticize inconsistent 
theories. 
Zwolinski 2008 clearly shows that it has not grasped that so-called ―justifications‖ or 
―foundations‖ as such are the problem, for it then claims to know where a ―theoretical justification of 
this approach can be found.‖ And there is a further irony in that it assumes it can be found in ―John 
Rawls‘s notion of an overlapping consensus,‖ concluding that ―libertarianism, with its robust 
toleration of individual differences, seems well-suited to serve as the principle for such a framework.‖ 
Exactly this point, and in favour of full libertarian anarchy, is argued in the final chapter of Lester 
2012 (2000), which was itself previously published in 1996 in the anthology For and Against the 
State,
13
 and first written 25 years ago in criticism of Rawls‘s original 1987 article.14 
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 Conclusion 
 
When philosophical accounts of libertarianism are written, they would do better not to neglect three 
things in particular. 1) Libertarian theories of interpersonal liberty: because liberty itself has to be 
primary to libertarianism and so needs to be understood. 2) Critical-rationalist libertarianism: because 
this is an entirely different epistemological approach from all the justificationist ones, and one that – if 
true – completely dissolves the problem of all failed ―justifications.‖ And 3) the extreme classical-
liberal or libertarian compatibility thesis, that there are no systematic theoretical or practical clashes 
when it comes to maximizing human liberty and human welfare: because this is a highly attractive but 
neglected possibility, and one that – if true – completely obviates many empirical, theoretical, and 
moral disputes. 
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